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Human communication has been described as involving the coding-decoding of a conventional 
symbol system, which could be supported by parts of the human motor system (i.e. the “mirror 
neurons system”). However, this view does not explain how these conventions could develop 
in the fi rst place. Here we target the neglected but crucial issue of how people organize their 
non-verbal behavior to communicate a given intention without pre-established conventions. 
We have measured behavioral and brain responses in pairs of subjects during communicative 
exchanges occurring in a real, interactive, on-line social context. In two fMRI studies, we found 
robust evidence that planning new communicative actions (by a sender) and recognizing the 
communicative intention of the same actions (by a receiver) relied on spatially overlapping 
portions of their brains (the right posterior superior temporal sulcus). The response of this 
region was lateralized to the right hemisphere, modulated by the ambiguity in meaning of 
the communicative acts, but not by their sensorimotor complexity. These results indicate that 
the sender of a communicative signal uses his own intention recognition system to make a 
prediction of the intention recognition performed by the receiver. This fi nding supports the 
notion that our communicative abilities are distinct from both sensorimotor processes and 
language abilities.
Keywords: social neuroscience, interactive game, fMRI, superior temporal sulcus
 neurons’ responding to both execution and observation of a given 
behavior (di Pellegrino et al., 1992), postulates that the intention 
conveyed by an observed behavior can be understood by means of 
a sensorimotor simulation (Gallese et al., 2004). However, com-
municative actions cannot be exclusively guided by predictions of 
the sensory consequences of motor commands acting on one’s own 
body (Wolpert et al., 2003), since they need to be selected by taking 
into account the receiver’s knowledge (Clark and Carlson, 1982) 
and they are designed to trigger a mental state, not an observable 
sensory event.
Here, we address the generation of human communicative 
actions, testing the hypothesis that effective communicative behav-
ior relies on a predictive mechanism constrained by conceptual 
knowledge (Goldman, 2006; Nichols and Stich, 2003), rather 
than by sensorimotor routines. The problem facing a sender is 
how to select a communicative action appropriate to convey a 
specifi c intention to a receiver. A sender could solve this problem 
by predicting the intention that a receiver would attribute to the 
sender’s action (Levinson, 2006). Crucially, we hypothesize that 
this prediction relies on the sender’s intention recognition system, 
taking knowledge and beliefs of the receiver into account. This 
hypothesis implies a computational overlap between selection and 
recognition of a communicative behavior in senders and receivers, 
respectively. A stringent test of this cognitive scenario is that the 
same cerebral structures support the planning of communicative 
acts (in the sender) and the recognition of the intentions conveyed 
by those acts (in the receiver), and that these cerebral activities are 
INTRODUCTION
We tend to think of human communication as basically involving 
the coding-decoding of a conventional symbol system, but fram-
ing human communication in terms of shared codes neglects its 
inferential nature (Levinson, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 2001). 
Human communication rides on a large background of pragmatic 
inference – otherwise ironies, sarcasms, hints, and indirections 
would pass us by. Nor are we troubled by the vagueness or multi-
ple ambiguities and semantic generalities in every utterance. The 
same system that resolves the coded messages probably lies behind 
our ability to communicate without any pre-existing conventions 
at all, as in the gestures one might use behind the boss’ back, or 
to signal to others out of earshot. A number of converging paths 
of evidence suggest that this faculty is distinct from our language 
abilities, and is ontogenetically and phylogenetically primitive to 
language (Levinson, 2006), yet at the same time constitutes the 
foundation for effective language use. This paper investigates the 
cognitive and cerebral bases of this faculty.
Given the pervasive ambiguity of communicative signals 
(Levinson, 1995; Sperber and Wilson, 2001), effective communi-
cation requires heuristics for selecting and interpreting the com-
municative intention of an observable behavior from a potentially 
infi nite search-space. A recent and infl uential suggestion assumes 
that communication could occur “without any cognitive media-
tion” by means of an automatic sensorimotor resonance between 
the sender of a message and its receiver (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004). This framework, grounded in the discovery of ‘mirror 
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modulated by the ambiguity in meaning of the communicative 
acts, rather than by their sensorimotor complexity.
Most human communication is a compound of coded conven-
tional symbolic meaning (as in language), and inferences about 
communicator intent and recipients’ abilities to infer it. In order to 
focus on the latter system, we tested the hypothesis of shared com-
putational overlap in communicators and recipients in the context of 
a controlled and unfamiliar communication system that prevented 
the participants from using pre-established linguistic conventions, 
forcing them to generate and interpret new communicative vis-
uomotor behaviors. Using a novel interactive game set in a real, 
on-line social context, we could study the mechanisms that create 
new communicative conventions, rather than the utilization of such 
conventions, while manipulating the communicative ambiguity of 
different experimental trials. Furthermore, by using a controlled 
communicative setting, it becomes possible to design control trials 
devoid of communicative purposes, but matched in sensory and motor 
features with the communicative trials. We have called this new 
experimental protocol the Tacit Communication Game (TCG).
Pairs of participants [labeled as sender (male) and receiver 
(female), each controlling one token on a common game board 
(Figure 1)] were asked to jointly reproduce the spatial confi gura-
tion of two target tokens (goals). When the goals were shown to the 
Sender only (communicative trials), solving the game required 
him to communicate to the receiver her own goal. Therefore, the 
Sender had to communicate to the Receiver the position and the 
orientation of her token. The Sender could achieve this only by 
moving his own token over the game board (Figure 1, phase 4). 
The receiver could then move to her own goal position, as inferred 
from the Sender’s movements.
By using time-resolved event-related functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), we could measure neurophysiologi-
cal correlates of planning a communicative action (in senders) and 
recognizing its communicative intention (in receivers), comparing 
these effects to the activity evoked during planning and observation 
of non-communicative actions, and distinguishing these effects 
from sensory and motor events occurring during the same tri-
als. Given that sensorimotor- and conceptually-based accounts of 
mind-reading make opposite predictions on the involvement of the 
motor system during communicative behavior, it becomes possi-
ble to distinguish between these general frameworks by examining 
the sensory/motor characteristics of the cerebral activity evoked 
during the selection of a communicative action.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We recruited 56 right-handed participants, aged between 18 and 
26 years, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
gave informed consent according to institutional guidelines of 
the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
Netherlands), and were either offered a fi nancial payment or given 
credits towards completing a course requirement. Twenty-four 
male–female pairs participated in the fi rst experiment. Eight par-
ticipants participated in the second experiment (six males). In the 
second experiment, the Sender (male, 31 years old) was an accom-
plice. For ease of explanation, in the following sections we consider 
a male sender and a female receiver.
It is known that cognitive abilities, stress responses, and cor-
responding regional patterns of cerebral activity are heavily infl u-
enced by the menstrual cycle (see for instance Fernandez et al., 
2003). In order to control this source of variability, we have chosen 
to scan almost exclusively males. Although this approach limits the 
scope of our inferences, it goes beyond the scope of this study to 
extensively assess the infl uence of gender differences in commu-
nicative abilities and their cerebral correlates.
MATERIALS
The tacit communication game (TCG) involves two players, a 
sender and a receiver, moving a token on a game board displayed 
on a monitor. Participants were trained in front of two 19-inch 
computer monitors, playing the TCG with hand-held controllers 
(Figure 1). The spatial lay-out of the buttons on the hand-held 
controller allowed for unique mappings between fi nger and token 
movements: four face buttons moved the token to the left, right, 
up and down; two shoulder buttons rotated the token clockwise 
and counter-clockwise; a third shoulder button was used as a start 
button (see below). Players sat on opposing sides of a long table, 
each facing their own computer monitor, wearing sound-proof 
head sets and ear plugs (to minimize the infl uence of sounds in 
the environment and incidental noises produced by the players). 
The game was programmed using Presentation version 9.2 and was 
run on a Windows XP personal computer.
During scanning, one participant lay supine in the bore of 
the magnetic resonance (MR) scanner, playing the TCG with an 
MR-compatible hand-held controller. The other participant played 
the game from another room while wearing a sound-proof head set. 
Experiment 1 lasted about two and a half hours (30 min training, 
45 min fi rst fMRI session, 10 min rest, 10 min training, 45 min  second 
fMRI, and 10 min anatomical scan). Experiment 2 lasted about 1 h 
and 30 min (30 min training, 20 min fi rst fMRI session, 10 min rest, 
20 min second fMRI session, 10 min anatomical scan).
PROCEDURES
Procedures – Experiment 1
The fMRI experiment consisted of two sessions: In one session 
40 communicative trials were presented, and in the other ses-
sion 40 non-communicative trials were presented. The exact same 
stimuli (including tokens and goal confi gurations) were used in 
the  communicative and the non-communicative sessions. As 
described above (see also Figure 1), the communicative trials 
required the sender to move his token over the game board to 
indicate to the receiver where she needed to go. During the non-
communicative trials it was made clear to the sender that the 
receiver also saw the goal confi guration. Hence, there was no need 
for the sender to communicate to the receiver the position and 
orientation of her token. Further instructions ensured that the 
actions of the sender were similar during the communicative and 
non- communicative trials. Namely, during non-communica-
tive trials, the sender was instructed to fi rst move his token to 
the target position of the receiver, match the rotation of the target 
token as closely as possible, and then move to his own position. 
This procedure ensured that, during both types of trials, send-
ers planned similar actions with their tokens. In contrast, during 
communicative trials, senders were meant to plan actions with a 
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a COMMUNICATIVE trial of the tacit 
communication game (TCG).
1. Sender and receiver see a 3 × 3 game board (in grey) on separate 
screens, with their own tokens (yellow, blue) positioned below and above 
the board, respectively.
2. The goal confi guration appears on the board. During COMMUNICATIVE trials, 
the sender, but not the receiver, can see the goal confi guration to be 
achieved at the end of the trial. The sender needs to share this informa-
tion with the receiver, and he can do so only by moving his token over the 
board.
3. When ready to move, the sender presses a start button and his token 
moves to the centre of the board, being visible to both players.
4. Within 5 s, the sender needs to move his token on the board (with the 
controller shown) to inform the receiver about her goal position and 
to reach his own goal position. The sender’s token was visible to both 
players. The double arrow indicates repeated (vertical) movements of the 
sender’s token.
5. The receiver can plan her movements while the sender’s token remains 
visible to both players.
6. When ready to move, the receiver presses a start button and her token 
moves to the centre of the board, being visible to both players.
7. Within 5 s, the receiver needs to move her token on the board (with the 
controller shown). The receiver’s token was visible to both players. The 
curved arrow indicates a 90° rotation of the receiver’s token.
8. A green (correct) or red (incorrect) box appears indicating if both players 
successfully matched the goal confi guration.
communicative value (for the  receiver). The order of the two ses-
sions was counterbalanced over participants.
To allow for comparisons between communicative and non-
 communicative trials over fMRI sessions both sessions also 
presented 40 basic control trials, which were the same in each 
session. This construction allowed for the comparison between 
different session events through the comparison of a shared con-
trol event. For a control trial it was made clear to the sender 
that the receiver could see the goal confi guration (similar to a 
non-communicative trial). The control trials were simplifi ed 
by asking senders to directly move their token to the correct loca-
tion, and thereby to completely ignore the token of the receiver 
(in contrast to the non- communicative and communicative 
trials where the position and orientation of the token of the 
receiver played a crucial role).
Two further aspects were considered in the design: motoric com-
plexity and communicative ambiguity. Motoric complexity varied 
naturally as some trials required planning of more moves (i.e. more 
button presses) and these could take longer to execute. Communicative 
ambiguity was varied by subdividing the  communicative trials in 
30 easy communicative trials and 10 difficult communicative 
trials. The difference between these two types of trials was that for 
easy trials senders did not face “orientation” problems. An example 
of an orientation problem is depicted in Figure 1: The sender has to 
indicate the rectangle needs to rotate with a token (a circle) that does 
not have a visible rotation. Pilot studies had shown us that without 
the orientation problem sender–receiver pairs quickly build up a set 
of successful un-ambiguous communicative actions. In contrast, with 
the orientation problem the actions of the sender stay ambiguous to 
the receiver for a longer time.
The experimental design was originally conceived to optimize 
the contrast between communicative and non- communicative 
 conditions. As will become clear in the “Results” section, the most 
relevant comparison turned out to lay in the contrast between 
difficult communicative and easy communicative trials. 
While the numerical disparity between Diffi cult and Easy trials 
might lead to imbalances in the estimation of the signal associ-
ated with each of these two conditions, the effects we report are 
relative to the reliability of their estimates.
Participants were trained extensively before playing the TCG. 
In a fi rst training session, the participants were individually famil-
iarized with the procedure of translating and rotating their token 
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around the game board. There were three different tokens: circles, 
triangles, and rectangles. In the second training session (10 trials) 
participants learned that the token placed below the game board 
was controlled by the sender, whereas the token placed above the 
game board was controlled by the receiver. During this training 
both sender and receiver could see two more (target) tokens inside 
the game board. These target tokens indicated the position and 
orientation that sender’s and receiver’s (playing) tokens should have 
at the end of the trial. The goal of this training was that each player 
positioned their own token in the designated position.
In the third training session, the participants were familiarized 
(15 trials) with condition-specifi c procedures of the TCG. There 
were two separate training sessions for communicative and non-
communicative trials, counterbalanced according to the order 
used for the ensuing fMRI sessions. The sender was informed 
about the trial type (communicative/non-communicative or 
control) by the hue of the receiver’s token. A bright receiver’s 
token was used during control trials, a semi-transparent token 
was used during communicative/non-communicative trials.
Procedures – Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we were interested in localizing brain regions involved 
in the observation/interpretation of communicative actions, in the 
context of the TCG. Accordingly, in this experiment we measured 
BOLD fMRI signals evoked in the receiver. The fMRI experiment 
consisted of two sessions: In one session 40 communicative trials 
were presented, and in the other session 40 non- communicative 
trials were presented. The communicative trials were the same in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (labelled as  communicative
Receiver
 trials). 
Furthermore, we introduced a new type of non-communicative trial 
(labelled as non-communicative
Receiver
 trials). These trials ensured 
that receivers were monitoring the actions of the sender, but with-
out attaching any communicative value to the movements. This was 
achieved by asking the receiver to move her token to the position in the 
game board where the sender last moved (i.e. translated or rotated) his 
token at least twice, and then rotate her token twice. We also informed 
the receiver that the sender moved according to our specifi c instruc-
tions, rather than trying to communicate to the receiver her target 
confi guration. In fact, unknowingly to the receiver, we played back the 
sender’s moves of his actual movements performed during the com-
municative trials scanning session. This procedure ensured that the 
receiver was presented with identical visual input (from the sender) 
and followed the actions of the sender in both scanning sessions. Most 
importantly, receivers only observed actions with a communicative 
value (from the sender) in a communicative
Receiver
 trial.
Differently from Experiment 1, here we compared commu-
nicative
Receiver
 and non-communicative
Receiver
 trials over fMRI 
sessions. We achieved this by relying on shared events in both 
sessions to serve as a baseline event (in this case the execution 
phase of the receiver).
Participants were trained extensively on the game procedures 
before playing the TCG during fMRI acquisition. The fi rst two 
training sessions were identical to those of Experiment 1. The 
third training session consisted of 20 communicative
Receiver
 trials, 
during which the receiver could not see the target  confi guration 
(Figure 1). Following this scanning session, the receiver was 
informed that he needed to solve a different problem (the above 
mentioned visual following task). The receiver practiced this 
new task for 20  trials. During the ensuing scanning session, 
the receiver was in the MR scanner, and performed 40 non-
 communicative
Receiver
 trials). There were 30 difficult commu-
nicative
Receiver
 trials, and 10 easy communicative
Receiver
 trials. 
We changed the ratio for easy and diffi cult trials from Experiments 
1 to 2, because we had learned from Experiment 1 (as will be 
shown below) that the diffi cult trials were most relevant.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
For Experiment 1 we calculated mean planning times (senders; 
time between the onset of the goal confi guration and the moment 
the sender pressed start), mean number of moves (senders), and 
mean accuracy scores (sender–receiver pairs). These dependent 
variables were analyzed using paired t-tests (threshold, p < 0.05) 
for communicative vs. non-communicative trials, and easy 
 communicative vs. difficult communicative trials. We con-
sidered a highly conservative level of chance performance by taking 
into account only the position (and not the orientation) of the 
target token of the receiver. If the receiver randomly places a token 
in the game board there is a chance of one out of eight (12.5%) 
that it is correct (in terms of position), given that the sender knows 
where to position his token, the receiver cannot position her token 
on top of the token of the sender, and there are nine initial positions 
in the gameboard. In reality, tokens often had to be rotated adding 
additional options for the receiver, but this would further lower the 
chance level and the conservative estimate of 12.5% suffi ced to show 
that sender–receiver pairs scored far above chance (see below).
During Experiment 2, mean planning times (receivers, time 
between the end of the visible movements of the sender and the 
moment the receiver pressed start), mean number of moves (receiv-
ers), and mean accuracy scores (sender–receiver pairs) were analyzed 
using paired t-tests (threshold, p < 0.05) for  communicative
Receiver
 vs. 
non-communicative
Receiver
 trials and easy  communicative
Receiver
 
vs. difficult communicative
Receiver
 trials. Only the trials in which 
the receiver moved to the correct position were taken into account 
for calculating planning times and number of moves.
IMAGE ACQUISITION
Images were acquired using a 3-Tesla Trio scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany). Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
sensitive functional images were acquired using a single shot gradient 
echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR/TE 2.50 s/40 ms, 34 trans-
versal slices, interleaved acquisition, voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). 
At the end of the scanning session, structural images were acquired 
using a MP-RAGE sequence (TR/TE/TI 2300 ms/3.9 ms/1100 ms, 
voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm).
IMAGE ANALYSIS
Functional data were pre-processed and analyzed with SPM2 
(Statistical Parametric Mapping)1. The fi rst four volumes of each 
participant’s timeseries were discarded to allow for T1  equilibration. 
The image timeseries were spatially realigned using a sinc 
 interpolation algorithm that estimates rigid body  transformations 
(translations, rotations) by minimizing head-movements between 
1www.fi l.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
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each image and the reference image (Friston et al., 1995). The 
timeseries for each voxel was realigned temporally to acquisition 
of the middle slice. Subsequently, images were normalized onto a 
custom Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)-aligned EPI tem-
plate (based on 28 male brains acquired on the Siemens Trio at 
the Donders Centre) using both linear and nonlinear transforma-
tions and resampled at an isotropic voxel size of 2 mm. Finally, 
the normalized images were spatially smoothed using an isotropic 
8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Each partici-
pant’s structural image was spatially coregistered to the mean of 
the functional images (Ashburner and Friston, 1997) and spatially 
normalized by using the same transformation matrix applied to 
the functional images. The fMRI timeseries were analyzed using 
an event-related approach in the context of the General Linear 
Model (GLM).
STATISTICAL MODEL AND INFERENCE – EXPERIMENT 1
We considered 10 event types2 for each scanning session (see 
Table 1), following the sequence of events described in Figure 1.
During the non-communicative session, we defi ned the same 10 
event types, replacing communicative with non- communicative 
trials. In both sessions, each event timeseries was convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function and used as a regressor 
in the SPM multiple regression analysis. In addition, we considered 
the modulatory effects of two further parameters, adding four 
further effects to the statistical model (for each session). First, 
we considered the effects of planning movements with different 
number of moves on the planning-related activities of the sender. 
This was modelled as a parametric modulation of the number of 
moves that the sender executed on a given trial on each of the three 
planning periods of the sender (events 1, 2, 3 in Table 1). Second, 
we considered the effects of  executing  movements of different 
duration on the execution-related activity of the sender. This was 
modelled as a parametric modulation of the movement time of the 
sender on the execution effect (event 4 in Table 1). We assumed 
a linear relation between number of sender moves and BOLD 
signal, as well as between the duration of sender  movement phases 
and BOLD signal. The corresponding regressors were introduced 
in the GLM on a subject-by-subject basis. Finally, the statistical 
model also considered separate covariates describing the head-
related movements (as estimated by the spatial realignment pro-
cedure) and their fi rst and second derivatives over time. Several 
studies have included these derivatives of realignment parameters 
to improve the sensitivity of their statistical analyses (e.g. Lund 
et al., 2005; Salek-Haddadi et al., 2003; Verhagen et al., 2008). Data 
were high-pass fi ltered (cut-off 128 s) to remove low frequency 
confounds, such as scanner drifts. Temporal autocorrelation was 
modelled as an AR(1) process.
The main focus of interest in this experiment was related to 
the difference (in the sender) between planning communicative 
and non-communicative actions. This difference was isolated 
by testing  planning-related activity for communicative versus 
non- communicative trials (having subtracted out control 
trials from each condition). This contrast can be expressed in 
terms of events in the fMRI design (see Table 1): The activity 
that was greater for events 1 and 2 (versus event 3) in the com-
municative sessions than for events 1 and 2 (versus event 3) in the 
non- communicative sessions. We also tested the reverse contrast 
to examine possible de- activations for  communicative trials. 
Finally, we also considered a more generic effect, related to the 
difference between planning actions that required the sender to 
take into account the target confi guration of the receiver (i.e., 
communicative and non- communicative trials) and planning 
action that were independent from the receiver (i.e., control 
trials). This difference was isolated by testing for a difference 
in planning-related activity between communicative and non-
 communicative trials, as compared to the control trials.
Session-specifi c parameter estimates were calculated at each 
voxel for each subject, and contrasts of the parameter estimates 
were calculated for the effects of sender planning communica-
tive actions, sender planning non-communicative actions, and 
sender planning control actions. These contrasts were entered 
2During a pilot phase, and after the collection of the imaging data, we tested whether 
there were high correlations between relevant regressors in the design matrix de-
scribed above. The experimental design and the statistical model described above 
ensured that the maximum correlation between planning-related and execution-
related regressors was <30%. Previous experience with these types of experimental 
designs have shown the validity of this approach, and its ability to effectively dis-
sociate planning- and execution-related effects (Thoenissen et al., 2002; Toni et al., 
1999, 2002).
Table 1 | The 10 events and durations defi ned for the communicative session.
Event Trial period Trial type Duration
 1 Sender planning COMMUNICATIVE EASY Variable (from presentation of target confi guration until
   Sender pressed the start button)
 2 Sender planning COMMUNICATIVE DIFFICULT As above
 3 Sender planning CONTROL As above
 4 Sender moving COMMUNICATIVE EASY COMMUNICATIVE DIFFICULT CONTROL Fixed – 5 s (from Sender pressing the start button)
 5 Receiver planning COMMUNICATIVE EASY COMMUNICATIVE DIFFICULT Variable (from presentation of the Receiver’s shape until
   the Receiver pressed the start button)
 6 Receiver planning CONTROL As above
 7 Receiver moving COMMUNICATIVE Fixed – 5 s (from Receiver pressing the start button)
 8 Receiver moving CONTROL As above
 9 Feedback Correct Fixed – 1.5 s (from presentation of Feedback stimulus)
10 Feedback Incorrect As above
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into a one-way, repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
 treating subjects as a random variable. The degrees of freedom 
were corrected for nonsphericity at each voxel.
We report the results of a random effects analysis, with 
inferences drawn at the cluster level, corrected for multiple 
 comparisons over the whole brain using family-wise error cor-
rection (p < 0.05) (Friston et al., 1996). Furthermore, to improve 
the sensitivity of the crucial test of the hypotheses described 
above, we have assessed the results of the fi rst two contrasts 
on the basis of independent anatomical information (Friston, 
1997), i.e. published stereotactical coordinates of areas related to 
 conceptually-based accounts of mind-reading (as studied with 
Theory of Mind tasks – fi rst cerebral network) or to sensori-
motor-based accounts (as implemented in the Mirror Neuron 
System – second cerebral network). Whenever necessary, we 
converted the published coordinates into MNI space. This pro-
cedure constrained our search space to a series of volumes of 
interests (VOI)3, ensuring increased and matched sensitivity for 
each cerebral network. We defi ned the fi rst cerebral network on 
the basis of (Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe et al., 2004), position-
ing six VOIs along the left and right temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ) (−48, −69, 21; 54, −54, 24), the left and right posterior 
superior temporal sulcuc (pSTS) (−54, −42, 9; 54, −42, 9), the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (0, 60, 12), and the posterior 
cingulate (3, −60, 24). We defi ned the second cerebral network 
on the basis of (Iacoboni et al., 1999), positioning six VOIs along 
the left and right inferior frontal gyrus (−51, 12, 14; 51, 12, 14), 
the left and right parietal operculum (−59, −26, 33; 59, −26, 33), 
and the left and right intraparietal sulcus (−37, −44, 60; 37, −44, 
60). We determined our VOIs on the basis of those particular 
reports given that, in our judgement, they provided landmark 
references for defi ning the cerebral correlates of Theory of Mind 
and Mirror Neuron responses. Those studies were also instru-
mental in defi ning tasks most commonly associated with Theory 
of Mind (i.e. false belief stories, recognizing intentions from 
human actions) and the Mirror Neuron System (action obser-
vation and execution), and they have been highly infl uential in 
determining the theoretical positions of these two accounts of 
intention understanding.
STATISTICAL MODEL AND INFERENCE – EXPERIMENT 2
We considered fi ve event types for each scanning session (see 
Table 2), following the sequence of events described in Figure 1.
During the non-communicative session, we defi ned the same 
fi ve event types, replacing communicative
Receiver
 with non-
 communicative
Receiver
 trials. In both sessions, each event timeseries 
was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
and used as a regressor in the SPM multiple regression analysis. We 
also included separate covariates describing the head-related move-
ments (as estimated by the spatial realignment procedure) and their 
fi rst and second derivatives over time. We left out the parametric 
modulations related to movements for Experiment 2 because the 
moves for the receiver, unlike the moves for the sender, were only 
related to simply moving their token to the target position. Data 
was high-pass fi ltered (cut-off 128 s), and temporal autocorrelation 
was modelled as an AR(1) process.
The main focus of interest in this experiment was related to the 
difference (in the receiver) between observing  communicative 
and non-communicative actions. This difference was iso-
lated by testing planning related activity for communicative 
versus non- communicative trials (each having subtracted 
out common  movement-related activity). This contrast can be 
expressed in terms of events in the fMRI design (see Table 2): 
The activity that was greater for event 2
R
 (versus event 4
R
) in the 
 communicative
receiver
 sessions than for event 2
R
 (versus event 4
R
) 
in the non- communicative
receiver
 sessions.
Session-specifi c parameter estimates were calculated at each 
voxel for each subject, and contrasts of the parameter estimates 
were calculated as described above. These subjects-specifi c con-
trasts were entered into a non-parametric test, treating subjects 
as a random variable. We report the results of a random effects 
analysis, corrected for multiple comparisons over the whole brain 
using family-wise error correction (p < 0.05). We employed the 
non-parametric variant of SPM (SnPM; Nichols and Holmes, 
2002). We used a locally pooled variance estimate (pseudo-t), with 
a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM (Nichols and Holmes, 2002). To 
optimize statistical sensitivity for both spatially extended clusters 
and high intensity signals, we used a combined threshold on the 
basis of voxel-intensity and cluster size (Hayasaka and Nichols, 
2004), using a pseudo-t value of 3 (corresponding to p ≈ 0.002) 
for identifi cation of supra-threshold clusters.
RESULTS
fMRI DATA
Table 3 provides an overview of the results obtained from the main 
contrasts in the random effects analysis. We found that planning 
Table 2 | The fi ve events and durations defi ned for the communicative session.
Event Trial period Trial type Duration
1R Sender planning COMMUNICATIVERECEIVER Variable (from presentation of target confi guration
   until Sender pressed the start button)
2R Sender moving Receiver observing   COMMUNICATIVERECEIVER Fixed – 5 s (from Sender pressing the start button)
3R Receiver planning COMMUNICATIVERECEIVER Variable (from presentation of the Receiver’s shape
   until the Receiver pressed the start button)
4R Receiver moving COMMUNICATIVERECEIVER Fixed – 5 s (from Receiver pressing the start button)
5R Feedback COMMUNICATIVERECEIVER Fixed – 1.5 s (from presentation of Feedback stimulus)
3The radius of each VOI was set at 10 mm, using the WFU PickAtlas software tool-
box (Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004), correcting for multiple comparisons over the 
joint volume spanned by the individual VOIs. This resulted in a t-value of 3 (cor-
responding to p ≈ 0.002) for identifi cation of supra-threshold clusters. Note that 
this threshold is only used to defi ne clusters, and does not denote the threshold for 
signifi cance of activations.
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novel communicative acts and understanding the communicative 
intention of these acts relied on the same cerebral tissue, namely 
the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) of the 
right hemisphere (Figures 2A–C,E). During the planning phase 
of the TCG there was no change in sensory input or motor output 
(phase 2 in Figure 2). Therefore, this differential planning-related 
activity cannot be driven by visual motion or hand movements. Yet, 
it is possible that this particular pSTS cluster is sensitive to sensory 
stimuli or to motor responses, having been implicated in the per-
ception of biological motion (Peelen et al., 2006) and in receiving 
reafferent motor-related activity (Iacoboni et al., 2001). We tested 
this possibility by assessing the BOLD activity measured during the 
execution of the communicative movements by the Sender (phase 4 
in Figure 2). During this period the Sender moved his fi ngers over 
the controller and perceived his token moving over the game board. 
There was no reliable activity during this phase (Figure 2D, “Sender 
moves” bar). Taken together, these responses indicate that this por-
tion of the right pSTS is not responsive to visual motion or to hand 
movements per se. Rather, this cluster appears to be involved in 
processing visual motion when this becomes relevant for inferring 
the communicative intentions of the agent (i.e. for the Receiver).
We reasoned that if the right pSTS is specifi cally involved in plan-
ning communicative intentions, then the response of this region 
should be modulated by communicative ambiguity, and not by the 
motoric complexity of the action used to convey the relevant infor-
mation to the Receiver. Therefore, we tested whether the pSTS activity 
(measured during the planning phase) was sensitive to (1) the differ-
ent communicative complexity of easy and difficult communi-
cative trials; (2) the number of moves performed in the execution 
phase of the communicative trials; or (3) the time spent moving 
during the execution phase of the same trials. There was no reliable 
linear relationship between pSTS activity and motoric complexity 
(Figure 2D, “Number of moves” and “Movement Time” bars), but 
there was a strong effect of communicative complexity (Figure 3).
The pSTS activity was co-activated with the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) (Figure 4A) previously associated with conceptu-
ally-based accounts of the human ability to make inferences about 
mental states of other agents (Frith and Frith, 2006b; Saxe et al., 
2004). The mirror-system regions hypothesized to provide effer-
ent copies of motor commands to the pSTS (Iacoboni et al., 2001) 
showed increased de-activations during the planning of commu-
nicative actions (Figure 4B). The difference between communica-
tive and non-communicative trials was present in the right pSTS, 
but not the left pSTS (Figure 4C).
In receivers, the same right pSTS activity was evoked during 
the recognition of the communicative intentions of the senders 
(Figures 2B,E). Similar to the sender, this activity was modulated by 
communicative ambiguity (Figure 5) and not present during motor 
execution (Figure 2F). The anatomical overlap between the activity 
evoked in the sender during the planning of communicative actions 
and the activity evoked in the receiver during the observation of 
the communicative actions (Figure 6) was unlikely (p = 0.017) to 
have occurred by chance, even at the relatively coarse spatial scale 
of group fMRI studies4.
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Senders had longer planning times, made more errors, and made 
more moves on communicative than on non-communicative 
trials, t(23) = 4.9, p < 0.001, t(23) = 7.9, p < 0.001, and t(23) = 4.7, 
p = 0.01, respectively (Figure 7A). Receivers made more moves 
on non-communicative
Receiver
 than communicative
Receiver
 tri-
als, t(7) = 5.9, p = 0.001 (Figure 7B).There were no differences 
for the planning times and the accuracy scores obtained in these 
two types of trials (both t(7) < 1). These results suggest that the 
receivers were able to infer the communicative intentions of the 
sender, and that the motoric demands of the non-communica-
tive
Receiver
 trials were actually larger than those of the commu-
nicative
Receiver
 trials.
Senders had longer planning times, made more errors, and made 
more moves on difficult communicative than on easy com-
municative trials, t(23) = 6.8, p < 0.001, t(23) = 13.4, p < 0.001, 
and t(23) = 3.6, p = 0.01, respectively (Figure 8A). Crucially, per-
formance remained well above chance level also in the difficult 
communicative trials [t(23) = 7.2, p < 0.001, given the most con-
servative estimate of chance for every trial (12.5%, see Materials and 
Methods)], despite showing a signifi cant increase in error rate as 
compared to the other trial types. Receivers made more moves on 
difficult communicative than on easy communicative trials, 
t(7) = 21.5, p < 0.001 (Figure 8B). There were no signifi cant differ-
ences for planning times and accuracy scores, t(7) = 1.5, p = 0.19, 
and t(7) = 2, p = 0.09, respectively. It is obvious that the behavioral 
Table 3 | Results of the random effects analysis related to COMMUNICATIVE (COM), NON-COMMUNICATIVE (NON-COM) and CONTROL trials.
 Area x y z T value No. of voxels
SENDER (PLANNING)
COM > NON-COM Right pSTS 50 −42 14 3.6 90
(COM AND NON-COM) > Control Medial prefrontal cortex 4 54 18 4.9 93
CONTROL > (Com and Non-Com) Left parietal operculum −52 −24 44 8.6 91
 Intraparietal sulcus −38 −34 64 8.0 48
RECEIVER (OBSERVING)
COM > Non-Com Right pSTS 50 −38 6 4.4 1074
 Posterior paracingulate cortex 0 −38 20 6.3 272
4A conservative estimate of this probability was obtained by using a coarse but au-
tomated parcellation of the human brain in 116 unique structures (Tzourio-Maz-
oyer et al., 2002). Given that we performed independent experiments, on different 
groups of subjects, the probability of fi nding activity in the same region for the 
receiver as for the sender is given by the number of regions found for the receiver 
[2] divided by the number of regions in which activity might have occurred [116] 
(2/116 ≈ 0.017).
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FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events in a COMMUNICATIVE trial of the TCG (all 
conventions as in Figure 1), and cerebral activity evoked in the sender 
and in the receiver during relevant trial epochs. (A) Planning 
communicative actions increased metabolic activity in the posterior part of 
pSTS of the sender’s brain (in red, MNI coordinates: 50, −42, 14, p < 0.05 
corrected for multiple comparisons).as compared to planning similar 
movements during NON-COMMUNICATIVE trials [(C); effect size: parameter 
estimates of a multiple regression analysis in standard error (SE) units], i.e. 
trials in which both players could see the goal confi guration. The execution of 
the movements evoked no signifi cant changes in the right pSTS activity of the 
sender’s brain (D). The observation of the same communicative actions 
increased right pSTS activity in the receiver’s brain [(B), in red, MNI: 
coordinates: 56, −38, 6, p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons], as 
compared to observing the same movements during non-communicative 
trials (E). The execution of the movements evoked no signifi cant changes in 
the pSTS activity of the receiver’s brain (F).
FIGURE 3 | Planning-related activity in the right pSTS of the sender’s 
brain was modulated by the diffi culty of selecting an adequate 
communicative behaviour. (A) When the sender could indicate the goal 
position of the receiver’s token (blue rectangle) by aligning his token (yellow 
rectangle) with her goal position, there was no signifi cant right pSTS activity 
(in magenta). (B) When the sender could not match the goal orientation of the 
receiver’s token (blue rectangle) with his token (yellow circle), there was 
robust right pSTS activity (in orange), both for correct and incorrect trials. 
Other conventions as in Figures 1 and 2.
difference between easy and diffi cult was not so pronounced for the 
receiver (actually only signifi cantly so for the number of moves). 
For the receiver the difference between trials was less pronounced 
than for the sender because in both trial types, the participant 
needed to move her token to a single target position on the board, 
and in this experiment the sender was a confederate, ensuring a reli-
able and homogeneous  communicative behavior across trial types. 
The number of moves used by the receiver to provide the response 
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FIGURE 5 | Activity evoked in the receiver during EASY and DIFFICULT 
COMMUNICATIVE trials in the right pSTS (MNI coordinates: 56, −38, 6). The 
plots show effect sizes (in standard error units) of cerebral activity evoked in 
the receiver during the observation epochs of EASY and DIFFICULT COMMUNICATIVE 
trials. The effect sizes were larger for DIFFICULT than EASY COMMUNICATIVE trials.
FIGURE 4 | Planning-related activity in cerebral regions of the sender’s 
brain during COMMUNICATIVE and NON-COMMUNICATIVE trials. (A) There was 
robust activity during both trial types in the mPFC (MNI coordinates: 4, 54, 18, 
p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons), a region previously associated 
with conceptually-based accounts of human mind-reading abilities. (B) There 
were robust decreases in activity in the left parietal operculum (MNI 
coordinates: −52, −24, 44, p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons) and 
intraparietal sulcus (MNI coordinates: −38, −34, 64, p < 0.05, corrected for 
multiple comparisons) regions previously associated with sensorimotor 
accounts of human mind-reading abilities. The decreases of metabolic activity, 
a sign of reduced neural activity, were signifi cantly stronger during the 
planning of communicative actions. (C) The plots show effect sizes for left and 
right pSTS (in standard error units) of cerebral activity from volumes of interest 
(VOIs – 10 mm centered on published stereotactical coordinates for the pSTS 
and adjusted for effects of interest) evoked in the sender during the planning 
epochs of COMMUNICATIVE and NON-COMMUNICATIVE trials.
FIGURE 6 | Illustration of the anatomical overlap of brain activity in the 
right pSTS of the sender and the receiver. Cerebral activity evoked in the 
sender during the planning of communicative actions is shown in 
yellow/red; cerebral activity evoked in the receiver during the observation 
of the communicative actions is shown in: (A) 3D rendering, and 
(B) sagittal section).
showed a signifi cant difference between the two trial types, but this 
difference is trivially accounted by the additional rotations of the 
receiver’s token required when solving the diffi cult trials.
DISCUSSION
We draw two main conclusions from these results. First, and most 
important, the fi ndings indicate that the same cerebral region, the 
pSTS, is involved in recognizing communicative intentions and in 
planning communicative actions, supporting the hypothesis that 
both types of cognition involve similar conceptual inferences. 
These fi ndings fi t with known properties of this region, namely the 
involvement of the pSTS in inferring the intentionality of observed 
actions, both in humans and macaques (Barraclough et al., 2005; 
Jellema et al., 2000; Pelphrey and Morris, 2006). We extend the 
scope of those fi ndings, showing that the contribution of the pSTS 
to intention recognition is not bound to the processing of biological 
cues, for example gaze or eye-hand joint movements (Barraclough 
et al., 2005; Puce et al., 1998), or point-light displays (Puce and 
Perrett, 2003). Crucially, here we show that the contributions of the 
pSTS extend beyond perceiving social cues, and include the gen-
eration of communicative actions. We suggest that this generative 
component is similar to what happens when people predict what 
type of action another person will do next (Aichhorn et al., 2006; 
Castelli et al., 2000; Jellema et al., 2000, 2004; Saxe et al., 2004). 
However, instead of making a prediction concerning the goals and 
intentions behind actions of others, a sender of a communicative 
action predicts the intentions that might be attributed by another 
person (i.e. the receiver) to that particular communicative action. 
In other words, pSTS is involved with the prediction of a forth-
coming intention attribution, possibly on the basis of previous 
experience with how people have interpreted one’s actions (Frith 
and Frith, 2006a; Schultz et al., 2005; Zilbovicius et al., 2006). Such a 
mechanism of predicting forthcoming intention recognition proc-
esses could explain the involvement of this region in different phe-
nomena, from the recognition of biological motion (Allison et al., 
2000), to the attribution of intentions (Castelli et al., 2000; Saxe 
et al., 2004), or the parsing of observed behaviors into conceptu-
ally relevant units (Zacks et al., 2001). Accordingly, it might not be 
surprising that developmental alterations in these basic percep-
tual mechanisms, as found in autism-spectrum  disorder patients 
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(Dakin and Frith, 2005; Zilbovicius et al., 2006), have serious 
consequences for human social behavior. Further research will be 
needed to determine how biological motion and nonverbal com-
munication are related. Perhaps, the same mechanisms putatively 
involved in the processing of biological motion, i.e. the extraction 
of posture sequences (Giese and Poggio, 2003), could also support 
the parsing of a string of object motions into communicative seg-
ments. In addition, although the present fMRI data support our 
apriori hypothesis of a computational overlap between recognizing 
communicative intentions and planning communicative actions, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that different parts of the pSTS 
support qualitatively different functions. In this respect, future 
single-subject electrophysiological studies might be able to test 
whether the same neuronal populations are involved in planning 
communicative acts and in recognizing the intentions conveyed 
by those acts, avoiding the anatomical scatter associated with the 
residual anatomical variability of fMRI comparisons (Petersson 
et al., 1999).
A second basic conclusion is that these fi ndings do not support 
the view that the mirror-system provides the foundations for human 
communication (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The pSTS activ-
ity was indifferent to sensory input and motor output, but it was 
sensitive to the ambiguity in meaning of the communicative acts 
(Figure 3). In addition, the mirror-system regions hypothesized to 
provide efferent copies of motor commands to the pSTS (Iacoboni 
et al., 2001) showed increased de-activations during the planning of 
communicative actions (Figure 4B), an  indication that  generating 
intentional communicative behavior actually reduce metabolic 
activity (Shmuel et al., 2006) in the  mirror-system (Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004). These observations are not consistent with the idea 
that sensorimotor simulations can account for human communica-
tive abilities. Nevertheless, it is theoretically conceivable that, in the 
pSTS, there is a non-linear relationship between number of moves/
moving time and BOLD signal. In this case, our current approach 
would not capture this relationship, i.e. we cannot exclude the pres-
ence of higher order curvilinear relationships between motoric com-
plexity and pSTS activity. However, given that these higher-order 
relationships would be devoid of any linear trend (since that would 
have been captured by our current analysis), it is not immediately 
obvious how they could be functionally interpreted.
Other interpretations of the fi ndings seem ruled out by details 
of the experiment. For example, the pSTS response cannot sim-
ply refl ect visual imagery of the movements, since it did not 
occur in non-communicative trials. Similarly, the pSTS response 
FIGURE 7 | Performance during COMMUNICATIVE and NON-COMMUNICATIVE 
trials – behavioral data for the fMRI experiment. (A) Planning times (ms), 
accuracy scores (%), and number of moves of the sender for COMMUNICATIVE and 
NON-COMMUNICATIVE trials. (B) Planning times (ms), accuracy scores (%), and 
number of moves of the receiver for COMMUNICATIVE and NON-COMMUNICATIVE trials. 
Error bars indicate standard errors.
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 cannot be a consequence of its putative role in matching efferent 
copies of motor commands with visual inputs (Iacoboni, 2005; 
Iacoboni et al., 2001; Keysers and Perrett, 2004). That hypoth-
esis predicts that the pSTS should be metabolically active during 
both action  execution and action observation (Keysers and Perrett, 
2004), but in this study the pSTS responses were strong during 
movement observation and absent during movement execution 
(Figures 2D,F).
It might be argued that the pSTS response refl ects subjects’ ver-
balizations, but the right-hemispheric lateralization of the effect 
(Figures 2A and 4C) is not consistent with the left-hemispheric 
dominance for phonological and syntactic processing (Frost et al., 
1999). Actually, the present fi ndings confi rm the crucial role of the 
right pSTS for processing pragmatic aspects of linguistic mate-
rial (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Mashal et al., 2007), an instance 
of the right-hemispheric dominance for inferring the communi-
cative intentions of a conversational partner (Sabbagh, 1999). It 
might be argued that the differential pSTS response during easy 
and diffi cult communicative trials (Figures 3 and 5) is driven 
by differential communicative success (Figure 8). However, this 
interpretation is not consistent with the fi nding that both correct 
and incorrect outcomes evoke signifi cantly positive and equivalent 
responses in the right pSTS of senders during diffi cult communica-
tive trials (Figure 3B). In fact, analysis of the senders’ movements 
during communicative trials suggests a different possibility. In 
the easy communicative trials, senders generated the same type 
of  communicative action (namely, move to the target position of 
the receiver, pause, and then move to his own target position). This 
behavior was consistent across trials and across participants, and 
the senders developed it during the task familiarization period prior 
to the scanning session. In contrast, during the diffi cult trials, the 
sender generated different communicative movements according 
to the geometry of his token, of the receiver’s token, and the past 
history of communicative trials. Accordingly, we suggest that the 
right pSTS distinguishes between trials requiring the formation of 
new semiotic conventions (diffi cult communicative trials), and tri-
als exploiting a recently established communicative behaviour (easy 
communicative trials). Finally, it should be emphasized that our 
fi ndings pertain to the generation of non-verbal communicative 
behaviors that are independent from shared conventional codes. 
It could be argued that this experimentally controlled scenario is 
artifi cial, failing to capture relevant aspects of human  linguistic 
FIGURE 8 | Performance during EASY and DIFFICULT COMMUNICATIVE 
trials – behavioral data for the fMRI experiment. (A) Planning times (ms), 
accuracy scores (%), and number of moves of the sender for EASY COMMUNICATIVE 
and DIFFICULT COMMUNICATIVE trials (error bars indicate standard errors). (B) Planning 
times (ms), accuracy scores (%), and number of moves of the receiver for EASY 
COMMUNICATIVE and DIFFICULT COMMUNICATIVE trials (error bars indicate standard errors).
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communication. However, we all start out as infants without 
access to the local communication conventions. In that respect, 
by addressing the human ability to quickly build new semiotic 
conventions, we deal with a crucial pre-condition for using ges-
tures and language as a communicative tool (Galantucci, 2005; 
Levinson, 2006). Accordingly, the current fi ndings are in line with 
ancillary evidence that points to distinct origins, in both ontogeny 
and phylogeny, of the foundational mechanisms for communica-
tion on the one hand, and language on the other (Levinson, 2006; 
Tomasello and Carpenter, 2005).
It has been argued that communicative actions are special (Frith, 
2007). Their planning is special, since the immediate goal of the move-
ment does not overlap with its actual communicative purpose. Their 
understanding is special, since they rely on the ability to recognize 
their communicative value, such that sender and receiver can share 
an intention (Tomasello et al., 2005). The present fi ndings provide 
a cognitive and cerebral ground for this special human faculty, sup-
porting the notion that our communicative abilities are distinct both 
from sensorimotor processes (with distinct areas of activation) and 
language abilities (with their largely left-hemisphere localization).
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